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Auerbach,' Lloyd K. Garrison,2 Willard Hurst,3 and Samuel Mermin. 4 San
Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961. Pp. xxvii, 915. $10.00.
BLACKSTONE defined his teaching role spaciously, in terms of "making aca-
demical education a previous step to the profession of the common law, and at
the same time making the rudiments of the law a part of academical education."5
Two centuries later we have congratulated ourselves enough for recognizing his
errors in executing those purposes. And we have begun lately to pay renewed
tribute to the soundness of his overall aims. There has been much recent soul-
searching among law teachers and their interested university brethren centering
on the two distinct but interrelated tasks Blackstone set-to provide an "aca-
demical education" for lawyers suited to their powers and duties in the com-
munity, and to present at least "the rudiments of the law" to those who will not
make it a profession but who are invited to deem themselves "liberally" educated
for citizenship in a legally ordered society when they take their college diplomas.
Though they have no cause to be smug, the law schools, or at least their
leaders, have begun to act upon the realization that it no longer is and probably
never was enough to teach the "science" of law as Langdell pioneered it. There
is increasing awareness that the American lawyer, starting with the early days of
constitution-making, has consistently and uniquely held "an unassailably strate-
gic position to influence, if not create, policy."03 Both the profession and the
schools have sensed and worked at the resulting demands for "education in
professional responsibility."1 Law teaching and teaching materials have not
only ranged outside the confines of case lav into the broader "legal" environ-
ment of the legislative and administrative processes, but in addition, there has
been hopeful experimentation in bringing the perspectives of non-legal scholars
to bear upon the search for understanding and justice.8
Recognition that the law is no island has led also to a revival of Blackstone's
concern over the essential ignorance among even most educated laymen re-
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garding the nature and functions of legal institutions.0 If work is to be done
toward narrowing this large gap in the usual liberal arts curriculum, some
primary efforts must obviously stem from the law schools. Encouragingly,
law teachers among others have observed and accepted the challenge. A
notable Harvard conference in 1954 and a steady stream of germinal writings
have considered the dimensions of the educational problem and the diverse
and endlessly debatable techniques of attempting to cope with it.1 Textual
materials have been prepared and courses created, and it may be expected that
such developments will continue.1
The potential values of such enterprises seem obvious. For the students who
will not be lawyers-but merely voters, jurors, litigants, witnesses, citizens--it
is difficult to reconcile ignorance of the law's workings with their supposed
credentials as educated adults. For those who may go on to law school, a sound
course of law study cannot hurt and may help. Such courses may even deter
those who should be deterred and invite those who might mistakenly have gone
elsewhere. Not least of all, the introduction of law into the liberal arts curriculum
holds promise for the more effective study and betterment of the law itself. If,
as no one should doubt any longer, the law and other disciplines have useful
things to tell each other about the single world they work in,12 the beginnings of
mutual understanding can only serve to improve the dialogues. Having acknowl-
edged unguardedly that law "is too important a matter to be left to the law-
yers,"'1 the lawyers are entitled at least to hope for aid, along with the occa-
sional discomfort of informed scrutiny from the outside.
The Legal Process is an impressive contribution to both of the efforts mention-
ed above-the broadening of the law school curriculum and the introduction of
law to undergraduates. Like Blackstone, but with the fuller vision vouchsafed to
four able scholars two hundred years later, it accepts in its first prefatory sen-
tence 14 the imposing challenge of introducing "the beginning law student and
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the college upperclassman and graduate student to the operation of our legal sys-
tem." The book is the product of successive revisions 15 of materials first pub-
lished in 1941, in mimeographed form, by Messrs. Garrison and Hurst under
the title Law in Society, revised under the present title in 1956, and again re-
vised for this publication. It is a careful, compendious, imaginative collection of
cogent materials and illuminating editorial comment. For reasons suggested
below, it may be that it is better suited to a law school course than to an under-
graduate or graduate introduction to law. This reviewer believes, however, that
a teacher could work happily and effectively with the volume in either of the
capacities for which it is designed.
As its preface promises, the book's vistas are sweeping. It undertakes to
describe, and to point up the perennial questions about, the methods, assump-
tions, and varying goals of "legal decision-making" (to use the authors' modern
but narrow term) by courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. Focusing
on the "process" of civil conflict and ordering, it does not purport to teach a
comprehensive body of substantive law. Its concern is with legal procedure,
organization, and techniques in the fundamental sense of these terms-in the
sense, that is, which recognizes "procedure" as a central determinant of a legal
system's character and values.
The materials are well chosen and interestingly organized around the problem
of industrial accidents as a kind of dramatic motif. The account begins with the
19th century handling (or mishandling) of this problem by the judges, re-
calling the creation and persistence of the fellow-servant, assumption-of-risk
and related rules which left the human risks of the new industry so largely
with the worker. With this topic as the central theme and the subject of the
actual cases (mostly from Wisconsin) offered for study, Part I of the book
("The Judicial Process in Common Law Development") introduces in didac-
tic form-through a rich array of textual selections plus editorial notes, com-
ments, and questions-most of the key elements of common law operations. It
considers, inter alia, court organization and procedure; the nature and uses
of precedent; the problem of holding and dictum; the role of the judge as
policy maker, with some of its political, social and ethical implications; the
nature and tensions of the adversary system; the jury and the continuing de-
bates about it; some aspects of the relationships between custom and law; and
the mechanics and theory of judicial decision. In terms of bulk these general
expository materials far exceed the relatively few cases on industrial injury;
the authors' computation for the book as a whole reports the proportions as
approximately eight to one. The result is that the running account of the
injury cases serves as a thread of substantive interest both to motivate and to
help in defining the text's main concern, with the "process" as such.
Parts II ("The Legislative Process and Its Relation to the Judicial Pro-
cess") and III ("The Administrative Process and Its Relation to the Legisla-
tive and Judicial Processes") follow the same conception. The Wisconsin
legislation is traced from the early statutes mitigating the common-law rules
15. P. vii.
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restricting employer liability to the achievement of the workmen's compensa-
tion law. Surrounding this focal concern, the materials range over the legisla-
tive process generally-the play of interest groups, legislative fact-finding, lob-
bying, etc.-and consider the judicial function and technique in statutory in-
terpretation. Similarly, Part III illustrates rule making, administrative ad-
judication, and problems of judicial review in terms of the administration of
workmen's compensation in Wisconsin. Again, this is staged upon a broader
background of materials exploring the procedures, issues and evolving prob-
lems (down to the Landis Report to President-elect Kennedy) of the adminis-
trative process in American experience.
As suggested above, the book's engaging plan-orchestrating its broad sub-
jects around the running theme of the handling of industrial accidents-has
strong organizing and dramatic values. Like everything, however, it has its
price. Perhaps the gravest loss from confining the case materials to this one
area is the resulting tendency to distort the role of the judges in the legal
process. Though one doubts that the authors sought such a result, the judges
emerge almost inevitably as the villains of the drama. We meet them first 10
in the person of Lord Abinger, misbegetting the fellow-servant rule of Priest-
ley v. Fowler," after parading horribles so imaginary and so legally dubious
as to have evoked Patterson's dry conclusion "that he was emotionally up-
set."'' 8 We observe the continued reign of the rule, largely intact, until the
enactment of workmen's compensation legislation in the present century. The
judges' unmourned career in this field is then traced through their rearguard
fight on the constitutional barricades, their grudging retreat to the role of
sniping at the statute and its administrators, and their belated acceptance of
the minimal demands upon industry to safeguard against or partially pay for
its human wreckage.
The story is an important one, to be sure, and not less worth the telling
because its heroes are not judges. It stirs issues and suggests insights of
some moment. It provides an apt point of departure for the book's introduc-
tion to the legislative and administrative processes, and to the materials re-
lating these to each other and to the judicary. It illuminates, and is in turn
illuminated by, the materials concerned with the elements of technique, ethical
choice, policy judgment and taught tradition comprising the judicial process
as we strive to know it. Above all, it poses vividly some crucial and perennial
issues about this process-about how far it is, or must be, or should be disabled
to lead effectively in prescribing new responses of the legal order to revolution-
ary social change.
Regardless of one's position on such issues, the roles of the common law
judges are by no means exhausted on this level. It is not news that the skep-
tical and experimental genius of the common law has much to commend it-
16. P. 15.
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and, more to the point, a great deal to teach-beyond its characteristic inabil-
ity to cope creatively with the transformations wrought by industrialization.
The concern for concrete cases in all their unpredictable individuality, the
steady willingness to challenge and adapt generalities, the capacity for wise and
flexible accommodations, at least within the framework of broadly settled or
accepted social policies-these enduring qualities of the common law are stated
among the writings this volume collects, but they tend to be lost or belied by
the story of the actual cases selected for study.
This suggested defect is probably not of the first importance for purposes of
the book's use in a law school curriculum. There is a large portion of three
years available for finding a reasonably rounded perspective from which to
view the common law. For non-law students, however, the problem is more
serious. If, as seems likely, the liberal arts curriculum in the near future will
find room for only one such course, it should not fail to convey some con-
crete feeling for the creatively pragmatic capacities of the common law method.
The purpose has nothing to do with providing a good press for the judges.
The purpose is to promote substantial learning goals the authors define 10-to
build appreciation, and perhaps emulation, of a powerful technique of rational
decision, to enrich the capacity for critical thinking, and maybe even to
"sharpen [the] sense of justice."
Recognizing that even a book of this one's impressive size must omit some
things, it may nevertheless merit another note of regret that there is no material
on the criminal law. Again, the loss is graver for the liberal arts student, and
again on the assumption that this will be his only broad-gauged introduction
to legal institutions. To be sure, the law schools themselves have tended to
slight the problems of criminal justice to a remarkable degree for sad reasons,
mostly of professional economics, which cannot continue to justify such neglect.
The fact remains that the problems of criminal responsibility, punishment and
procedure go to the heart of a society's values. Granted the painful choices en-
tailed by the confines of a single course, one would hope that a place could be
found for some exploration of this area.2 0
Of course, there can be no final decisions about such matters of choice. And
it is neither likely nor desirable that any instructor using The Legal Process as
a teaching vehicle would fail to make exclusions and additions of his own.
The important judgment for present purposes is the one already submitted:
that this volume, in its overall direction and content, should on the whole serve
admirably in either of its proposed functions. As the text for a first-year law
course, it offers large jurisprudential horizons to widen a curriculum that tends
still to be weighted heavily on the side of substantive "coverage."'' As an un-
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dergraduate or graduate student's introduction to law, it promises enlighten-
ment not only, or mainly, from its wealth of information about the legal system,
but because it displays the system as it should be perceived-in process, quest-
ing.
MARVIN E. FRANKELf
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA. Edited by Al-
bert P. Blaustein.* South Hackensack: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962. Pp.
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The triumph of Communism in China made the world's most populous
country the subject of a gigantic social and economic experiment. If Western
social scientists have been slow to face the challenges implicit in this experi-
ment, the response of their lawyer colleagues has been even more disappoint-
ing. Anglo-American and European journals contain merely a scattering of
articles on Communist Chinese law, and except for the careful work of Leiden's
M. H. van der Valk,1 these articles are general in nature and reveal meager
research. Elsewhere the situation is no better. While Japanese writers have
published profusely and have occasionally transmitted data not otherwise
available outside the mainland, for the most part they have been either un-
willing or unable to subject their materials to serious and impartial analysis.
More predictably, much the same can be said of both Soviet and Nationalist
Chinese sources. Thus, thirteen years after the founding of the People's Re-
public of China, we know little of its legal system.
This state of affairs does not reflect subject matter intrinsically lacking in
interest. Study of the role of law in the application of the Communist formula
for rapid industrialization of Asia's major society should add to our under-
standing of law, of Communism, and of the process of modernization. Nor
can our present ignorance of Chinese law be attributed to its lack of political
significance. It has by now become commonplace to note the need for "a study
of Communist Chinese legal principles, seeking for any indication of possible
common grounds upon which, on a long-range basis, a world legal order em-
bracing the communist and non-communist countries can be built."2 We should
also expect lawyers to contribute substantially to the more immediate task
of comprehending political developments in Communist China. We might re-
call that a principal purpose of Henry VIII in establishing chairs in Roman
Law at Oxford and Cambridge was to educate English diplomats for dealing
with the countries of the Continent.
How then explain this failure to undertake serious research on contemporary
Chinese law? The Chinese language is only the foremost deterrent to Western
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